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This paper studies the consequence of an imprecise recall of the price by the consumers
in the Bertrand price competition model for a homogeneous good. It is shown that rms
can exploit this weakness and charge prices above the competitive price. This markup
increases for rougher recall of the price.
If rms have dierent production costs, those with higher costs are not driven out of
the market. However they choose to have a higher price in equilibrium, therefore price
dispersion arises. It is shown that rms behave on average as a monopolist with stricter
demand and that price dispersion increases with the price recall errors. If bigger recall
errors happen, then both consumers and rms on the aggregate level are worse o, for some
parameter choices. Furthermore being given the irrational choice that some consumers
make, there are situations where the protection of a monopolist against entrants is a
welfare maximizing policy.
The introduction of more rms in the market does not have a signicant impact on
the prices. Even though the presented model is static, it can be interpreted as a stage
game of an innitely repeated game where a Nash Equilibrium is played in every stage.
The intuition is that consumers do not actually seek information before every purchase,
but have a vague idea of the price they faced in previous purchases.
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Price Dispersion, Bertrand Paradox
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11 Introduction
There is hardly someone that knows the precise price of a given consumption good
in the closest stores. Take a retail store, one may have a reasonable idea on the average
price level at dierent stores but one does not recall the precise price of golden apples.
The textbook model of price competition for homogeneous goods assumes however that
consumers are fully informed about the prices posted by the rms. Everything else equal
this means that not all consumers head to the store actually having the lowest prices, as
commonly assumed.
While the issue is absent from the Industrial Organization literature, the Marketing
literature has handled it for decades. Monroe and Lee (1999) present a summary on price-
awareness research, stating that previous studies have found that the average absolute
recall error ranges from 6% to 19:45% of the correct price1. Neglecting this limited
rationality of consumers cannot be seen as a merely theoretical simplication, for it implies
that in the basic price competition model with a homogeneous good rms charge a markup
over the cost and that prots are therefore non-zero. Furthermore equilibrium prices will
depend on the number of rms and do not equal marginal costs.
In this paper a model for the pricing behavior of rms in a Bertrand setting facing
consumers with imperfect recall is proposed, abstracting from other (classical) deviations
as heterogeneous goods, search costs, spatial competition, product dierentiation, price
discrimination, etc. The imperfect recall on prices is modeled as a random shock (with
mean zero) that is added to the real price. Consumers decide where to shop following
their wrongly recalled prices, but at the store the demanded quantity is a function of the
real price. It is shown that rms charge a markup, following a pricing strategy equivalent
to that of a monopolist facing a stricter price elasticity. The markup increases with the
incorrect recall of prices by consumers.
Once the full awareness of the price is dropped, price dispersion becomes a possibility
because consumers do not fully react to the price dierences. In the present model it arises
due to cost dierentials, which also means that rms with higher costs are not driven
out of the market. Instead of mixed strategies or random strategy pricing equilibria, this
model proposes the inability of consumers to screen between high and low cost rms as an
explanation for the existence of price dispersion on a homogeneous good. The monopoly
analogy is still robust for dierent costs. Intuitively one might foresee that larger recall
errors would imply lower equilibrium price gaps because of diminishing incentives to price
dierentiation among rms. In reality the low cost rm will choose to make its price
advantage more salient, increasing price dispersion.
Introducing more rms has a weak competition pressure on prices, which does not lead
to marginal cost pricing even with innitely many rms. In fact increasing the number of
rms can at most have the same eect as reducing the price recall errors of consumers to
half. It is shown that the equilibrium price dispersion has a sensitive dependence on the
cost structure of the rms in the market.
Both exogenous and endogenous shocks are considered. In the latter consumers are
aware of their limitations and can choose to make a higher costly eort in order to improve
the accuracy of their price recall. The rms are however fully rational and maximize their
prots anticipating the errors of the consumers.
While the proposed model is a static game, it can be interpreted as the (constant)
outcome of a repeated game where there is no learning process by the consumers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature in the eld, Section
3 introduces the basic model and discusses the main implications, Section 4 examines the
introduction of more rms and the importance of the price structure, Section 5 endogenizes
1The authors argue in the mentioned paper that consumers do recall more than what they explicitly
acknowledge, but there is no doubt that price recall is not perfect.
2the price recall error committed by the consumers, Section 6 compares the results of the
present paper with closely related models in the literature and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a closely related literature to this paper on pricing with boundedly rational
consumers. Hehenkamp (2002) proposes an evolutionary game where consumers only re-
ceive information about the prices of the rms with some given probability. Sellers on
the other hand have a probability of learning about the other sellers' prices and prots,
mimicking the one with higher prot. Depending on the level of sluggishness, i.e. fre-
quency with which they receive new information, the equilibrium price will fall between
the marginal cost and monopoly pricing regimes. Chen, Iyer, and Pazgal (2005) use the
limited memory model of Dow (1991), where consumers do not recall the exact price but
only a price range to which it belongs, the price ranges being optimally chosen. These
consumers constitute a fraction of all consumers in a price competition setting, the re-
maining being either fully informed or fully uninformed. In equilibrium they choose to
have ner partitions in the low prices range, and rms choose to have a degenerate ran-
dom price strategy, where the number of possible prices equals the number of memory
partitions. In Gabaix and Laibson (2004) and Gabaix, Laibson, and Li (2005) consumers
make errors when evaluating their inherent value of a product. Having rms competing
for an homogeneous good leads in this case to a markup. The authors show that increas-
ing competition, i.e. more rms in the market, has almost no consequence in terms of
a markup decrease. If allowed to increase noise of the product evaluation, e.g. through
confusing characteristics of the good, they choose to do so in an inecient way.
Another branch of pricing models where rationally bounded consumers are exploited
is add-on pricing. In Gabaix and Laibson (2006) consumers are unable to fully take into
account the add-on charge, so that rms have positive prots.
Search costs are another source of imperfect competition leading to similar outcomes.
The seminal paper by Diamond (1971) assumes that consumers do not know the prices of
rms, having to visit dierent stores, only purchasing when a price below a given cuto
price is found. Prices will be adjusted to a unique equilibrium price in nite time, namely
the monopoly price. Stahl (1989) shows that assuming two types of consumers (zero and
positive search costs) leads to intermediate results, i.e. equilibrium prices between the
marginal cost and the monopoly pricing.
Starting with Varian (1980) there is a literature mainly interested in price dispersion,
where it is assumed that rms choose a random pricing strategy, in opposition to a xed
price. That is the strategy space is a set of probability distrubions, not the the positive
real numbers. In Varian (1980) a fraction of the consumers is persistently uniformed
about the prices, but having a reservation price. If stores are allowed to choose a random
price distribution, they choose to do so in equilibrium balancing the probability of having
the lowest price (and therefore getting the informed consumers) and maximizing prots
with the uninformed consumers. Spiegler (2006) comes to a similar conclusion when
all consumers are unable to take the random pricing strategy into account, and thus
sample the prices in the stores taking thereafter that sample as the nal price and picking
the lowest price. In this context bounded rationality can also be attributed to rms as
in Baye and Morgan (2004). Consumers are fully informed and rational whereas the
rms choose random pricing strategies playing either Nash equilibrium, quantal-response
equilibrium or "-equilibrium. It is shown that the last two are closer to the results obtained
in experiments (where subjects choose prices and rational consumers are played by the
computer). In Alos-Ferrer, Ania, and Schenk-Hoppe (2000) rms play a pricing oligopoly
evolutionary game, following a simple behavior of imitation and experimentation.
While formally close to the present paper, the product dierentiation paper by Perlo
3and Salop (1985) has a dierent motivation. Their paper suggests a model with dierenti-
ated goods where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the available products.
Firms exploit that by charging a markup, which is increasing in the variance of the pref-
erences. In the limit case of xed demand that model is formally equivalent to the models
where consumers make mistakes about the value of the good (as in Gabaix and Laibson
(2004) and Gabaix, Laibson, and Li (2005)) and to the present model, where consumers
have imperfect recall of prices. This is discussed in Section 6.1.
On the empirical side Monroe and Lee (1999) show that consumers do not perfectly
recall the prices when explicitly asked to do so. Baye and Morgan (2004) and Pan,
Ratchford, and Shankar (2004) indicate that price dispersion exists in settings which are
very close to the textbook Bertrand competition. In the experiment of Kalayci and Potters
(2009) individuals playing the rms choose to make product comparisons more complex to
the individuals acting as consumers, so that they do not choose optimally allowing rms
to charge a markup. This markup is increasing in the confusion caused in consumers.
While having a dierent motivation, the present model can be thought of one of
horizontal dierentiation with xed positions as a rst intuition. The value of the good
is the same across consumers, but each one is biased towards one of them. Therefore
having a higher price does not imply zero demand. Firms compete for the indierent
consumer (here the one recalling prices as being equal) at the margin, etc. But as it shall
be seen the results dier, because the 'gap' between one consumer and one rm, in the
horizontal dierentiation models, decreases the value of the good to the consumer either
due to transportation costs or preferences in the product space. That is not the case for
imperfect price recall. This is discussed thoroughly in Section 6.2.
3 Model
3.1 Basic Setup
Consider two risk neutral rms, A and B, selling one homogeneous good whose cost
of production is zero. Firms announce their price simultaneously, pA by rm A and pB
by rm B.
Consumer  2 [0;1], recalls prices p0
i = pi +
i , for i = A;B, where 
A and 
B are in-
dependently and identically distributed shocks for each  with non-degenerate probability
density function f() and cumulative distribution function F() with an expected value of
zero2. The consumers then do their shopping at the rm with the lowest recalled price3
(it can be assumed that they randomize in case of a tie, but this happens with probability
zero). At the store they learn the real price so the demand curve is therefore given by
the real and not the recalled price. It is assumed that transportation costs between the
two rms are high enough, in the sense that the consumer does not visit the second store
if she learns that the real price of that rm is higher than the recalled price of the other
rm. This may be pictured as having the consumer at home wondering where to buy
a product without accurately remembering the prices. When the consumer gets to the
chosen store and learns the real price, her cost of going to the other store and checking
its price as well is higher than the (possible) expected gain.
2For a more detailed model of memory related bounded rationality see Mullainathan (2002).
3An equivalent interpretation of the same setting is to consider that the consumer visits the rms sequen-
tially. On the arrival at the second rm, she does not correctly recall the rst price p1 but recalls it plus a
shock given by p1 + 1   2. If she considers the second price as lower, she buys there instantly, otherwise she
goes back to the rst rm. This interpretation is very close to the model in Chen, Iyer, and Pazgal (2005), but
it relies on a unintuitive assumption. It must be assumed that in those cases where the consumer decides to
return to the rst rm, she never returns to the second if she learns that she made a mistake. In other words
the transportation costs of the two rst trips are negligible, but the third trip is innitely costly.
4Firms anticipate this behavior and play best response to their competitor's strategy,
resulting in a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. Notice that for a degenerate distri-
bution shock with zero variance and zero mean this model reduces to the basic Bertrand
model. Firms are risk neutral.
Let D(p) be the demand curve of each consumer, where p is the real price of the rm
at which the consumer is buying the good. Firms are assumed to be aware of this demand
function. When facing the prices p0
A and p0
B, consumer  will nd price pi lower than pj






 pi;pj) = P
 
pi + 












f(y)F(y + pj   pi)dy
= g(pj   pi);
where g(x) is the market share of a rm whose price is lower than its competitor price by
x. It is given by g(x) =
R 1
 1 f(y)F(y + x)dy. Notice that g0(x) =
R 1
 1 f(y)f(y + x)dy.
Moreover g(x) is independent of  because all consumers have the same price recall shock
distribution. Now given the behavior of consumers, rm i maximizes expected prots
i(pi;pj) = pig(pj   pi)D(pi) over pi  0 with i;j = A;B, i 6= j, where  is the
number of consumers. Without loss of generality it is assumed that  = 1. The rst order
condition for a maximum is
@i
@pi








, "(pi)   pi
d
dx
lng(pj   pi) =  1; (1)
where "(p) 
dlnD(p)









@pi lng(pj  pi) =  pi
d
dx lng(pj  pi) being the own price elasticity of
the market share of rm i. This is just the usual result of a prot maximization but it
will help giving some insight to the model later in this Section. Now further assumptions
on functional forms are stated.
Assumption 1 The random shocks A and B are iid with mean 0, variance 2 and full
support on the real line with probability density function f(:) and cumulative distribution
function F(:). Moreover the distribution of A and B is such that g() is logconcave, i.e.
d
dx lng(x) is non-increasing in x.
Assumption 2 The price elasticity "(p) of demand is continuous, non-increasing and
 1  "(0)  0.
Notice that Assumption 2 is rather weak, linear demand is an example that satises it.
Compare it with the necessary conditions for the classic monopolistic price setting model
to be well-dened, i.e. unique prot maximizing price, namely that "(p) takes the value
 1 for one and only one ^ p and that it is bigger (smaller) than  1 before (after) ^ p4.
Assuming "(0)   1 guarantees that the equilibrium will not be a corner solution, having
rms outside the market. The following results will be used.
4These conditions guarantee that the derivative of the prot function equals zero for one unique price, and
that it is quasi-concave.
5Lemma 1 For each pj  0, j 6= i, i = A;B, equation (1) has a unique positive solution.
Proof
First it is shown that the left-hand side (LHS) of (1) is decreasing in pi. The rst
term, "(pi), is non-increasing according to Assumption 2. In the second term the part
d
dx lng(pj   pi) is positive, because
d
dx














dx2 lng(pj   pi)  0;
where @x
@pi =  1 was used. Because rm i only considers pi  0, pi is obviously positive
and increasing in pi. Therefore minus their product, i.e. the second term on the LHS is
negative and decreasing in pi. Hence, the LHS is decreasing in pi.
Now, for pi = 0 the LHS equals "(0)   1 because @
@pi lng(pj   pi)jpi=0 is nite due to
the random variables' full support. For pi > 0 the rst term of the LHS "(pi) is negative
and non-increasing in pi. In the second term limpi!1
d
dx lng(pj   pi) is strictly positive
because d
dx lng(pj   pi) is strictly positive and non-decreasing in pi. This part of the
second term is multiplied by pi, therefore the second term goes to  1 as pi ! 1. This
implies that the limit of the LHS is  1 as pi ! 1. Hence the LHS must equal  1 for a
unique pi, for any given pj  0.
The suciency of the condition for a maximum is implied by the above mentioned
uniqueness.
Lemma 2 The rst order conditions are sucient for the prot maximization problem.
Proof
It follows from the proof of Lemma 1 that the solution for @i
@pi = 0 for pi  0 is unique
and that @i
@pi switches its sign, from positive to negative, at that point. These properties
imply that i(pi;pj) is quasi-concave on pi for any pj, so that the FOC are sucient.
The next step is to see that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It was shown
in the proof of lemma 2 that the reaction curves are properly dened, the next step is to
prove that they cross. The symmetry of the problem indicates the possible existence of a
symmetric equilibrium. It is known that for each pj there is a unique pi(pj) solving (1),
so it can be checked in (1) whether some pi = pj = p is a possible solution. For rm i,





Since g(0) = 1
2,
2pg0(0) = 1 + "(p): (2)
From Assumption 2 which implies that "(0)   1 and "(p) is nonincreasing, and the fact
that g0(0) is positive it is concluded that equation (2) has just one solution p  0.
Lemma 3 The reaction curves implied by the rst order conditions yield a unique (sub-
game perfect) equilibrium price p for both prices.
Proof
From (1) it is possible to prove that the slope of the reaction curve pi(pj) lies between
0 and 1. To see this consider an increase  in pj  0, which increases the LHS of (1).
6An increase in pi (to be precise in pi(pj)) of  would oset the decrease of g() (because
g contains the term pj   pi) but would increase the factor by which @
@pi lng(pj   pi) is
multiplied, that is pi, and decrease "(pi), yielding a total decrease in the LHS. Because
the LHS is strictly monotonous in pi, the price pi implicitly dened by (1) (that is the
best reaction of rm i) must increase less than . In other words the slope of the reaction
curve satises
@pi(pj)
@pj < 1 for all pj  0, and by symmetry
@pj(pi)
@pi < 1 for all pi  0. This
means that pi(pj) is always atter in the (pj;pi) plane than pj(pi), implying that they
only cross once. There is therefore no other equilibrium besides pA = pB = p.
Proposition 1 In the basic model where consumers suer a price recall shock and rms
face zero costs, the rms are able to charge a nonnegative price in equilibrium p dened
by
2pg0(0) = 1 + "(p) (3)
Moreover they charge p = 0 if and only if a monopolist also would do it.
Proof
The last statement follows from setting p = 0 in (2) and noticing that it is only a solution
if "(0) =  1, which is the case where a monopolist is indierent between selling and
exiting the market.
Thus in this model rms are able to exploit the bounded rationality of consumers. The
intuition of the result, in opposition to the zero prot solution, is that announcing a price
lower than that of the opponent is not enough to attract all consumers, because some
of them will still recall the price as higher. This means that charging a price marginally
below, equal to or marginally above the opponent is irrelevant. The pressure of price
competition is eroded by the inability of consumers to reward rms with lower prices,
that is failing to give the right incentives for rms competing on the same good.
Here there are two trade-os playing a role in the price-setting decision. One is a
Hotelling type of trade-o, higher revenue per consumer vs higher market share, the
other one is that of a monopolist, higher revenue per unit sold vs more goods sold per
consumer. The equilibrium price depends on the strength of both.
3.1.1 Recall Mistake and Hotelling Trade-o
The rm opts between the increase of market share achieved through lower price, and
the revenue per consumer achieved through higher price. This appears in equation (3)
in the term g0(0), which stands for the marginal decrease in the market share due to a
price increase. In other words, it is the marginal change of the indierent consumer as in
Hotelling models.
The term g0(0) is lower for higher variance. The intuition is straightforward, the more
diculties the consumers have in remembering and therefore comparing the prices, the
smaller the marginal change in the market share due to a price variation. Suppose the
change of the variance is achieved through the \spreading" of the possible random values,
that is changing x to x with  > 0. The new density function f satises f(x) =





f0(x)dx = 1, where x =  1y and dy=dx =  was used.















or simply g0(0) =  1g0
0(0), where g0
0(0) is the g0(0) for  = 1. The variation in the new
7equilibrium price is seen in the new version of equation (3)
2pg0(0) = 1 + "(p)
, 2pg0
0(0) =  (1 + "(p)): (5)








As expected, higher price uncertainty  means higher price markup. Compared to the
xed demand case (take "(p) = "0(p) = 0) this inuence is however smaller, because the
denominator is now bigger and the numerator smaller (remember that 0  1+"(p) < 1).
The intuition is that rms must also take the diminishing demand into account. It is not
true that the marginal increase of the price due to  is always diminishing for it depends
on the value of "0(p). Two extreme results can however be established.
Corollary 1 For a decreasing price recall error variance the equilibrium price goes to the
Bertrand price.
Corollary 2 If the demand allows for a monopoly price, i.e. there is a ^ p such that
"(^ p) =  1, then for an increasing price recall error variance the equilibrium price goes to
the monopoly price.
The rst result follows easily from (5) with  ! 0 which forces the rst term to be
zero, and because the derivative of g0() is a strictly positive constant, p must be zero.
The second result follows from the fact that the rst term in (5) is bounded (because p
is bounded) so as  ! 1 it must be that 1 + "(p) ! 0.
3.1.2 Monopolist Trade-o
Because each consumer's demanded quantity also depends on the stated (in opposition
to recalled) price, rms face a monopolist-type of price setting trade-o. High price means
higher per unit revenue but also less units being sold. Because of non-increasing elasticity
of demand this monopolist type of decision also decreases the equilibrium price. This can
be seen in (1'), where both non-increasing elasticities are added up and set equal to  1.
Notice that the left-hand side of (3) is positive at p, so in equilibrium it must be that
(p) >  1, that is the equilibrium price has the monopoly price (if it exists) as an upper
bound.
3.1.3 Explicit Equilibrium Solutions
To gain some more insight several specic functional forms are considered. Suppose
demand D(p) has a linear elasticity over all p  0 range, with "(p) =  (a + bp) for some
a 2 [0;1] and b  0. Equation (3) simplies to
2pg0(0) = 1   (a + bp);





As a comparison, for the same price elasticity a monopolist would charge price pM = 1 a
b .
If the recall errors A and B follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
82, which satises Assumption 15, then g0(0) = (2
p
) 1. If they follow a Gumbel
distribution6 with cumulative distribution function F(x) = e e
 (x )
for some  2 R,
 > 0 and variance 
2
62, then g(x) = 1
1+e x
7. Now it holds g0(0) = 
4.
Some comments can be made for this closed form solutions. When rms face consumers
with a wrong price recall, they charge a price which is related to the monopolist price.
Formally it is equivalent to an increase in the slope of the demand elasticity, the worse
the price recall is the atter the slope. While this slope is not an intuitive concept, it
may help to recall that the monopolist price does not depend on some point elasticity
but on the price at which this elasticity crosses some threshold, namely  1. The higher
(in absolute terms) the slope, the smaller the price the monopolist rm, as well as the
competitive rms here, will choose.
The term related to the price recall depends on the standard deviation of the shock.
For  ! 0, the price goes to the usual Bertrand price equilibrium, that is p = 0.
Taking the linear term of the Taylor series expansion in respect to , at  = 0, gives
the rst order impact of introducing a price shock compared to usual Bertrand, namely
1 a
2g0(0).
For small b the monopolist is able to charge a high price, because demand is very
inelastic in the low prices range. Here competition among the rms compensates for the
inelasticity of demand and sets a lower price.
3.1.4 Strategic Complements
The proof of Lemma 3 shows that the choices of the two players are strategic comple-
ments. Because the demand of consumers at the rm is not aected by the other rm's
price, the market share is the only variable at stake. The actions are therefore strategic
complements. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to model the dynamics of the
equilibrium process, it is known from experimental economics (see Fehr and Tyran (2008)
for instance) that games with strategic complements tend to converge faster to the equi-
librium and to be more stable. The bounded rationality of the agents playing the rms
is therefore a minor issue here.
3.1.5 Other Comments
Equation (3) provides a testable prediction of the model, provided that the price recall
variance and the slope of the elasticity of demand is known. If valid, it can be used to
estimate one from the other.
While having dierent motivations and intuitions the present model is formally equiv-
alent for the basic case to one of horizontal dierentiation with unitary demand and
bounded support of the recall errors. It is easy to see that for each choice of parameters
in this model, there is a distribution of consumers on the horizontal line and a distance
(transportation or preference) cost that yield the same problem and therefore the same
5The sum of two independent random variables following N(0;
2) is a normal random variable with
N(0;2























(x) is similar to the so-called
hazard function
0(x)





( x) must be strictly increasing, therefore
0(x)
(x) is strictly positive and strictly decreasing.
Hence Assumption 1 applies to the normal distribution.
6Also known as Fisher-Tippet or log-Weibull, this distribution is important in Order and Extreme-value
Statistics. It is also widely used in the literature on random utility models and on quantal response equilibria
because of its mathematical tractability.




1+ex, which is decreasing in x.
9result. The position on the line represents the price recall bias8 towards one of the rms,
the distance cost represents the dispersion of recall biases, the rms being located at the
extremes of the line9. The intuition is straightforward, in both cases there are consumers
that are inherently inclined to one of the rms, and this hinders perfect competition.
This similarity while giving helpful insights to the intuition in the present model, only
holds for the basic setup. See Section 6.2 for further discussion.
3.2 Firms with Symmetric Costs
In this Section rms face a positive constant cost c for the production of the good.
Because of the non-linearity of the model, the results will be more complex but with
simple and intuitive limit cases. The objective function of rm i can be written as
i(pi;pj) = (pi   c)g(pj   pi)D(pi);










In this Section the previous assumptions are also made so that the earlier lemmas will
also be applicable here and these conditions will be sucient.
Proposition 2 If the rms face the same strictly positive unitary cost c, Assumptions 1
and 2 imply the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, where the equilib-


















=  "(pi)   pi
@
@pi
lng(pj   pi); (7)
enables a similar proof to the one of Proposition 1. The LHS in (7) decreases monotonically
from 1 at pi = c to 1 when pi ! 1, and the RHS in (7) increases monotonically from
 "(c)+c d
dx lng(pj  c) at pi = c to 1 as pi ! 1, so the equation is satised for only one
pi  c for every pj. This single crossing implies quasi-concavity of i in pi for any pi given
pj  c, and therefore suciency of the rst order conditions above. The focus is again





=  "(p) + 2g0(0)p: (8)
8It is not strictly speaking a bias, because it is drawn from the dierence of two random variables, but
visualizing it as a bias may help the intuition here.
9In the bounded support case rms must be placed in the extremes, otherwise the consumers that would
be placed outside the section between the two rms, would have exactly the same price recall bias. One of
the rms could then have a discontinuous market share increase if its (negative) price dierence in comparison
to the other rm would be bigger than the distance cost between the two rms. In the case of full support
the rms should also be located at the \extremes", otherwise there would not be consumers with all possible
values of recall biases.
10Again it is easy to see that there is such a p and it is unique. The reasoning in the
proof of Lemma 3 can also be applied here, noting that a hypothetical increase in pi of
the same amount as a hypothetical increase in pj would not only increase the RHS but
also decrease the LHS. This implies that pi(pj) increases less than pj, in other words, the
reaction curve slope is below 1. The equilibrium price p is therefore unique.











where  "(p)  "(p) 2g0(0)p. Equation (9) is comparable to the usual rst order condition
p c
p =   1
"(p) for the monopolist. The introduction of the consumer errors leads to the
situation where rms have a monopolist like behavior but their Lerner index is reduced
by a term that depends on the variance of the consumers' errors. The intuition is that
once the consumer is at the rm, that is when the demanded quantity is set, the rm can
act as a monopolist. But because of the a priori price competition, prices cannot be set
too high.
To see that the equilibrium price and Lerner index are indeed smaller than those of
the monopoly, notice that introducing 2g0(0)p on the right side of (8) yields a lower right
hand side. Because the left (right) hand side of (8) decreases (increases) with p, the
equilibrium price must be strictly smaller. Notice also that the additional term 2g0(0)p
depends on the price, indicating that there is a variance-price level interaction in the
equilibrium Lerner index10.
The variation of the equilibrium price, or the Lerner index or the markup, as a function
of the cost c depends on the two terms in the denominator. For low c and consequently low
p, the rst term may prevail so that the Lerner index is close to constant and the markup
is increasing in c. However for high costs the second term becomes predominant if  "(p)
does not increase indenitely (or at least it increases less than proportional to p), meaning
that the Lerner index will be proportional to p 1 and the markup will be constant. In
the rst case the recall errors are so high compared to the costs that consumers are
shopping randomly. While for high c the  "(p) can be neglected so that the markup will
be proportional to the standard deviation of the errors, namely given by




Considering higher prices in the denominator is equivalent to lower variances (recall that
g0(0) is inversely proportional to the standard deviation), the intuition being that the price
recall error is relatively smaller when compared to the absolute value of the price. Once
again the price and therefore the markup increases with the price recall errors magnitude
10The same analysis concerning the equilibrium price is not straightforward, because it is impossible to
distinguish the changes due to the cost from those due to the diminishing demand. If the demand function is
normalized, that is if the new demand function ~ D() is chosen such that ~ D(p + c) = D(p) 8p with p  c  0,









 1 f(u)f(u + pj   pi)du
R 1











 1 f(u)f(u + rj   ri)du
R 1
 1 f(u)F(u + rj   ri)du
= 0;
so that the optimal markup r
 equals the no-cost equilibrium price and p
 = r
 + c. The markup is therefore
the same.
11by consumers. This can be seen from equation (8) (by implicit dierentiation) that shows








3.3 Firms with Dierent Costs and Price Dispersion
Introducing asymmetric costs for the rms leads to two interesting results. Firms with
higher costs for the same homogeneous good do participate in the market, with higher
equilibrium prices, for there will be always consumers recalling its price as smaller. The
second feature is already implicit in the previous statement: the model predicts a price
dispersion situation in a homogeneous good market.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are once again taken. Firm A faces unitary cost cA > 0 and rm
B faces cB > 0. The prot of rm i = A;B is given by i(pi;pj) = (pi ci)g(pj pi)D(pi).
In order to maximize it, rm i solves @i
@pi = 0, that is
pi
pi   ci
=  "(pi)   pi
@
@pi
lng(pj   pi); (11)
with i;j = A;B and i 6= j. Proposition 2 can be applied here with two changes. First the
issue of existence of one equilibrium, i.e. an intersection of the reaction curves implicitly
dened by (11), must be put dierently because the system of equations is now asymmet-
ric. Take cB > cA without loss of generality. The best response pB(cA) of rm B to the
minimum price that rm A may oer, cA, satises pB(cA)  cB > cA. So (cA;pB(cA))
lies 'above' (taking pB as the vertical axis) or on the (pA;pB) = (cA + t;cB + t), t 2 R,
diagonal. On the other hand, pA(cB) satises pA(cB)  cA so (pA(cB);cB) lies below or
on that diagonal. From Proposition 2 it is known that the best response curves always
cross the main diagonal pA = pB
11, and they do that only once because
@pi(pj)
@pj < 1 for all
pj  0 with i;j = A;B, i 6= j. So either pA(cB) lies on the same side of the main diagonal
as pB(cA) (the crosspoint with the main diagonal lies then below cB, representing a price
combination that is never considered by the rms) so that pB(pA) must cross pA(pB)
only once to get to the main diagonal, or pA(cB) lies on the other side which means that
pA(pB) will also cross the main diagonal, crossing therefore pB(pA) as well.
The second dierence is that the equilibrium will not be symmetric, being thus im-
plicitly dened by a system of equations with equation (11) and its counterpart, instead
of being simply dened by (8). The FOC do not have here a closed solution because
pA = pB does not hold. It is however possible to determine how the equilibrium prices
change depending on the costs through implicit dierentiation of the FOC, when costs
depart from the symmetric case c = cA = cB. In Section A.1 in the Appendix it is derived
how both rms \react to changes" in one of the costs, which is shown in formulas (22)
and (23). Some comments on those formulas are as follows.
3.3.1 Cost Price Relation
In the symmetric case it was clear that a higher cost implies a higher equilibrium price.
While the trade-o here is quite more intricate it is the case that a cost increase of one
rm leads to a price increase by both rms.












11Take pj to be the equilibrium price in the symmetric cost scenario with costs being c = ci. By denition
the best reply of rm i in this case is to set pi = pj, that is pi(pj) = pj.
12Proof
Inspecting equation (11), which denes the best strategy pi given pj and ci, it can be
seen that the left-hand side of equation (strictly) increases in ci and the right-hand-side
(strictly) decreases with pj. Now for a given pj an increase in ci leads to an increase in
the response pi dened by (11). From Section 3.1.4 it is known that the price strategies in
this game are strategic complements, so the best-response pj of rm j shall also (strictly)
increase. This decreases the right-hand side of equation (11), which further increases the









@ci > 0. At last, from
@pi(pj)
@pj < 1, which is shown in the proof of lemma 3 (notice that the FOC of rm j are









One might have foreseen that a smaller cost gap would mean a more competitive
market, meaning lower prices of both. Consider the case where the low cost rm suers a
cost increase. The high cost rm could choose to take benet of the competitor handicap
by trying to attract more consumers, that is by lowering the price. But it appears that
the revenue increase that is attainable by a higher price of the high cost rm, dominates
the benets from trying to attract more consumers.
3.3.2 Monopolistic Aggregate Behavior
On the aggregate level, the rms act (locally) as a monopolist. It is known that the












Recall that the monopolist price pM and the symmetric cost equilibrium price p are
dened in the same way given "() and  "(), respectively. It was already shown in equation
(9) that the competitive price follows the cost in the same way as the monopolist price,
when the cost of both rms change. To see that this is also the case for a change in just













the factor 2 appearing because an increase in ci yields just a half increase in the average
cost and the factor 1
2 is needed to have the average price change (and not their sum).































(p "0(p)    "(p))
: (13)
Equation (13) tells us that the average price of the rms follows the corresponding
average cost as a monopolist price follows its cost, just performing the custom substitution
from "(:) to  "(:). In other words, the costs of the individual rms are irrelevant for the
average market price determination once the average cost is known.
3.3.3 Recall Error Amplitude and Price Dispersion
Price dispersion, dened here as the price dierence, is driven in this model by cost
dispersion. Thus to analyze it, it should be checked how the price dierence depends on















(p"0(p)   "(p)) + 8(p   c)2g02(0)
as shown in Section A.2.
The demand and the recall error eects must now be disentangled. If demand falls
sharply at some given price, rms will not choose to price their goods above (or largely
above) that level, no matter what the cost structure and recall error level are. The best
way to study the recall error eect is to x elasticity of demand at p, and this is so for a
strong reason. The equilibrium price in the symmetric case is a function of elasticity (not
of demand or the derivative of demand alone). Therefore xing elasticity does not change
the symmetric equilibrium outcome as it would happen if D(p) or D0(p) were xed, even
if just locally.
Proposition 4 Price dispersion, dened here as the price dierence, is ceteris paribus
an increasing function of the recall error standard deviation.
Proof















" + 8g02(0)(p   c)2
: (14)








@ci at ci = cj (and therefore the price dispersion when the rms' costs are similar)
is locally an increasing function of the recall error.
Note that as consumers become more inattentive, it could be thought that the dimin-
ishing competitive pressure on the rms would lead to lower price dispersion, as it leads
to higher markups, because consumers are less responsive to price gaps. It turns out that
it is optimal for the low cost rm to increase this gap.
3.3.4 Welfare Analysis
Price recall errors can be regarded as a weakening of competition, given that the in-
centives of a erce price competition are smaller. There are however some counterintuitive
results with important welfare and policy implications. To have some insights a compari-
son between the extreme cases, perfect price recall and random shopping, is made. In the
rst case the basic textbook equilibrium arises. The low cost rm will charge the lowest
of the following two, the price it would charge as a monopolist and the cost of the other
rm. The high cost rm simply takes price equal to cost. At the other extreme, the two
rms are monopolists on half of the market, so they simply both charge their monopolist
prices.
Prots of the high cost rm go up (not necessarily monotonically) from zero to half
of the monopolist prots, from one extreme to the other. If the low cost rm charges
his monopolist price in the perfect competition situation, then its prots decrease (not
necessarily monotonically). Otherwise it depends.
On the aggregate level a surprising result occurs.
Lemma 4 There are instances where rms are worse o, on the aggregate level, when
facing higher standard deviations of the recall errors.
Proof
First it is shown that a degenerate distribution can be taken without loss of generality
for the recall errors i, i = A;B, so that the setting is the basic Bertrand model. From
14equation (11) it is concluded that the full support case can be arbitrarily close to this
solution, because the last term goes to zero as the recall error standard deviation goes to
zero, given that g0() ! 0, while the other terms are bounded. Furthermore, if demand
is bounded then prots also converge to the degenerate case. Considering the degenerate
case is thus a simplication.
Take any cA, D(p) and corresponding "(p) such that the monopolist problem of rm
A has a solution, call it pM
A , yielding strictly positive prots. Assume that cB > pM
A . In
equilibrium the market will be completely covered by rm A setting pM




A ) and B = 0.
Now consider a new recall error distribution with full support. It follows directly from





























This example is sucient to prove the lemma.
While the proof mentions an extreme case, it is clear that worse price recall can
decrease the total prots in a broad set of parameters. Larger recall errors push more
consumers to the rm with higher price, that is the one with higher cost, whose prots
are typically lower.
Lemma 5 Worse price recall decreases the welfare of both the rms and the consumers
in some instances.
Proof
Notice that the welfare decrease for the consumers alone, follows directly from the sym-
metric cost case. To prove the lemma it must be shown that it happens in cases where the
aggregate prots also decrease, which is not the case for symmetric costs. Recall the cases
from the previous proof. As the standard deviation increases, the share of consumers
buying at rm B can be arbitrarily close to one half, given that an increasing number
of consumers will recall the price of the high cost rm as lower. This implies further
that p
A can be arbitrarily close to pM
A . Taking a linear demand function for instance, it
becomes clear that the extra consumer surplus that the consumers still at rm A get due
to existence of two rms in the market, i.e. rm A is not a monopolist, is smaller than
the welfare cost of the other half, that switched from monopolist A to duopolist B.
This result is striking given the previous qualication of price recall errors as a cause of
weaker competition. In fact, if consumers shop (close to) randomly then goods are being
bought at high price which does not imply higher prots since consumption is being shifted
from a low to a high cost rm. Whilst this observation is obvious, the counterintuitive
nature of the above result is simply a consequence of it. In further extensions of this
model, where the standard deviation of the price recall is somehow manipulated by the
rms, it may happen that rms choose strategies that make them worse o.
Furthermore, for xed price recall error amplitude, one may wonder if competition is
itself welfare decreasing. In other words, may a duopoly be something that should be
avoided in comparison to a monopoly? This is indeed the case, again because consumers
do not make optimal choices. If the possibility of buying at higher prices is somehow not
there, in some cases the welfare is higher with a monopoly in comparison to the duopoly.
Proposition 5 In a market where consumers do not perfectly recall the prices, protecting
a monopoly from entrant rms is in some instances optimal from the consumer welfare
point of view, as well as from the social welfare point of view.
Proof
Straightforward conclusion from the proof of Lemma 5, just considering the degenerate
15distribution in the proof simply as the monopoly, which is then compared with duopoly.
Notice that the proofs of the above two lemmas use the extreme case of recall er-
rors with degenerate distribution, for simplicity. Given the continuity of the equilibrium
prices (therefore prots and surpluses) as a function of the error standard deviation, the
results apply for other non-extreme parameter choices. The statement in Proposition 5 is
not related to parameter choices but to dierent market structure under the same condi-
tions, and should not be confused with the lemmas. The proposition compares monopoly
with duopoly, where the monopolist case happens to be equivalent to the duopoly with
degenerate errors.
The many rms case is not discussed in this Section, but the result in the proposition
can be easily extended to that case.
3.3.5 Some Examples
Take again a linear elasticity, "(p) =  (a + bp), and the Gumbel distribution for the








































Only the two limiting cases, cA = cB = 0 and cA = cB ! 1 will be discussed because
other cases yield intermediate results.
For cA = cB = 0 the price is driven by the recall error of consumers, and is therefore



















2 + 2[1   a]
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which are also positive. Notice that as in Section 3.1.3, as costs (and therefore equilibrium
prices) increase, the level of the demand elasticity, which is dened by the parameter a,
becomes irrelevant (it enters the rst order conditions as a=pi). Only the slope of the
elasticity b is maintained. It is thus easy to see that the derivatives at c ! 1 are smaller
than at c = 0.
16In equilibrium the prices will rise with an increase of any of the two costs. Firm's
pricing behavior lies between the perfect competition lower bound and the monopolist
upper bound, depending on the size of the recall error (which fosters towards the upper
bound) and the relative cost advantage (also towards the upper bound).
Figure 1 shows some examples how incorrect price recall aects the market, in the case
of dierent costs of rms. The variance of the price error increases from left to right. In
the rst column consumers are able to recall the price with very good precision, so that the
outcome is close to the classic setting. A rm sets the monopolist price for low production
cost, switches to a price slightly below the other rm's price for low intermediate cost, and
follows his own cost for high costs. Its market share is almost 100% for low own cost and
almost 0% for costs higher than the other rm's cost. In the last column the consumers
are very unaware of the chosen prices so that they almost shop randomly, as can be seen
in the slowly decreasing market share of rm i on the second row. Because consumers
almost shop randomly, rms set a price close to the monopolist price given their cost.
Figure 2 illustrates Lemma 4.
4 Three or More Firms
In the Bertrand pricing model with no product dierentiation, the number of rms
is irrelevant as long as it is more than one. In this extension with more than two rms
the equilibrium will present however an intuitive outcome: the price will decrease as the
number of rms increases, though only slightly. Moreover this result does not depend
on the number of consumers in the market, so it is entirely driven by the competition
among the rms. To see this notice that the number of consumers  just appears as a
multiplicative constant in the prot function. Thus its maximization is independent of
the value of .











F(y + pj   pi)dy









The prot of rm i = 1;:::;n is
i(p1; ;pn) = (pi   ci)Gi(p1   pi; ;pn   pi)D(pi): (15)













lnGi(x i) = 0; (16)
where xj = pj   pi.
Assumption 1 is now generalized as follows.
Assumption 3 The random shocks 1;:::;n are iid with mean 0 and full support on
the real line with probability density function f(:) and cumulative distribution function
17F(:). Moreover the distribution of 1;:::;n is such that, for each i = 1;:::;n and x i,
@







lnGi(x i)  0 .
Assumption 3 assures the existence of the equilibrium, whose proof is easily obtained
from the n = 2 case. For uniqueness it must be assured that the best response hyper-




@pj < 1 for any p i  c i, i and
j 6= i.
Consider a pj increase in pj. Notice that an equal increase in pi osets the increase









lnGi(x i)  0. Following the same reasoning steps as in the
n = 2 case, it is concluded that the change in the best response to pj is some pi
satisfying pi < pj which proves the uniqueness of equilibrium.
Lemma 6 The imperfect price recall model for many rms, has one and only one equi-
librium if Assumptions 2 and 3 are satised. This equilibrium is implicitly dened by
equation (16).
4.1 Symmetric Costs




















































 "(p) +  n 1
n p:
The competition pressure due to an increase in the number of rms has a small impact.
Observe that an increase in n from 2 to 1 is equivalent, in terms of markup setting, to
just halving the standard deviation of the recall error (which is proportional to 1
 ). As a
corollary, note that the Lerner index does not go to zero as n ! 1. Gabaix and Laibson
(2004) also conclude that the number of rms has a low impact in decreasing the charged
markup, while in Stahl (1989) it even brings the equilibrium price closer to the monopoly
price.
184.2 Asymmetric Costs
Due to analytical complexity, the results in the n = 2 case cannot be extended. It is
however possible to obtain numerically the equilibrium prices for a given cost structure.
The graphs in the Appendix show the equilibrium prices and dierent price dispersion
measures for cases with n = 3, Gumbel distributed shocks and "(p) =  1
2 for any p  0.
Two price dispersion measures are presented, namely the dierence between maximum
and minimum price as well as its ratio. The standard deviation of prices seems to follow
very closely the pattern of Max-Min in all cases that were checked, whereas the standard
deviation/mean ratio follows Max/Min.
In the rst case, depicted in Figure 3, the rms' costs are given by the cost vec-
tor (c1;c2;c3) = (1;2;3). Except for a minor exception (see discussion below in the
(c1;c2;c3) = (1;2;2) case), all prices grow with the price recall error. The behavior of
price dispersion depends on the chosen measure.
More interesting is the comparison between (c1;c2;c3) = (1;1;2) and (c1;c2;c3) =
(1;2;2), presented in Figures 4 and 5. They dier signicantly, while one might have
thought the opposite given that both cases have the same cost values, the only dierence
being the number of rms having the dierent costs. If there are two low-cost rms they
compete among them setting the competitive price, i.e. price marginally above cost, for
small recall errors. As errors grow larger, their market share becomes less dependent on
the price and they opt for a price close to that of the high-cost rm. The price dispersion
is therefore decreasing in the errors standard deviation.
If there is only one low-cost rm, it is sucient for it to charge a price slightly below
the high cost. As higher errors are considered there are two eects that become clear.
Initially the need to dierentiate its price from that of the high-cost rms is predominant,
so that it actually chooses a lower price. But then the eect of having a market share
which is less dependent on the price starts to act and the low-cost rm raises the price
again. This explains the steepest price dispersion increase among the three considered
cases. While a deeper analytical investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, it becomes
clear from the above examples that the cost structure of the rms in the market have a
strong inuence on the equilibrium prices and price dispersion.
5 Price Dependent Error Variance
A shortcoming of the previous Sections is the arbitrariness of the shock variance. In
this Section it is assumed that the recall error is in some way related to the value of
the good. As a simple example one may think of the uncertain price of a coee in a
bar comparing to the uncertain price of an expensive computer. While in the rst the
consumers may have a 0:20e `condence interval' in the second case this would be
around 100e12.
5.1 Exogenous Variance
Setting the shock proportional to the equilibrium price would lead to an implicit
denition problem. The cost of the good is however a good proxy for it. In this Section
it is assumed that rms face cost c to produce the good and the price observation of the
consumers suers a shock whose standard deviation is an increasing function of c.
Derivation is very similar to above and Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 can be applied here.
Prots are still given by i(pi;pj) = pig(pj  pi)D(pi), but the standard deviation is now
12See Vanhuele, Laurent, and Drze (2006) for empirical evidence on the harder memorability of lengthier
prices.




c where g0 is just the benchmark g()








Introducing this cost dependence modies the competition pressure term in the equi-
librium Lerner index. Higher costs mean lower attention (in absolute terms) paid by
consumers. If constant elasticity is assumed, to abstract from demand driven changes,








which can be regarded as an equation on
p
c. This means that in equilibrium the ratio
p
c
is the same for any c, meaning that the markup is proportional to cost.
5.2 Endogenous Shock Variance
While the previous Section has an intuitive outcome regarding the dependence of
markup on the cost of a good, it would be more realistic to allow consumers to choose an
eort according to the amount of money involved. For instance Sorensen (2001), while
related to search costs, states that consumers put a higher search eort for pharmaceutical
products that they buy more often. Here the standard deviation of the recall error will
be associated to the eort they will be putting in remembering the exact prices, which
is denoted by . It is assumed that for a given eort level  the recall error will be
proportional do c, in other words the eort is not related to recalling the last digits of
the price but the rst digits. Thus the standard deviation of a given distribution g0() is
here multiplied by c (in the above Section  = 1). The consumer faces here a trade-o
between mental eort and overspending.
As proxy for the costs of overspending the following is used c, that is the standard
deviation of the recall error chosen by the consumer times , a constant related to the
error distribution.13 The idea is that higher recall errors imply higher expected losses
from choosing the rm with the highest price.
As stated before consumers will face a mental eort cost of reducing , h(). It is
assumed that decreasing the recall error - lower  - is increasingly costly, h0() < 0;h00() >
13This choice can be motivated by a more complex modeling as follows.
Let the consumer be concerned about the worst expected loss that may happen for a given standard deviation.
In other words, for a given price dispersion x  maxpi   minpi there is an associated expected loss (when
the consumer mistakenly chooses the rm with the highest price) and the consumer will take into account the
highest value of the expected losses across all x. While this choice is not very intuitive, it must be noticed that
a priori the consumer is not aware of the price dispersion distribution x, so she cannot calculate the expected
loss.
Consider the case with pA < pB. The probability of shopping at B by mistake is 1   g(x). Hence the
expected loss due to false recall is x(1   g(x)). The consumer is not aware of the real prices and therefore not




where g(x) is the probability of choosing the lowest price given eort . While Assumption 1 does not
guarantee the uniqueness of this maximum, it exists and is unique for many distributions (like Normal and
Gumbel). Now, as seen in the discussion of equation (4) the standard deviation enters g() as a number by
which x is divided. So for a given recall error distribution, the above maximization has the same solution
if solved for
x
c, a solution which is independent of . In other words the maximum expected loss () is
just (linearly) proportional to c, which motivates the choice for the overspending proxy. The proportionality
constant is denoted by .
200 so that
@h()
@( ) > 0 and
@h
2()
@( )2 > 0. Consumers will thus compare the benet c and
the cost h() of making a memory eort . Equalizing marginal benet c and marginal
cost h0() yields the optimal recall error of consumers.
Take for instance h() = 1
 as the eort cost. Then consumers minimize the losses








. Recall that while the consumers choose  the shock standard deviation
will be c. The idea behind this result is that consumers do make bigger mistakes when
recalling a price of a more expensive good, but this mistake is only proportional to the
root of it. In other words, when buying the outt consumers exert a bigger eort in price
comparison because the stakes are higher.
Once again Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 regarding the equilibrium in the rms' price game are
applicable here, because rms take the consumers' eort as given. The equilibrium price











For costs and thus prices close to zero the rst term on the right hand side overweighs
the second, so that the equilibrium price is close to the monopoly price. But for higher
costs (and assuming that  "(p) increases less than proportionally to p for high prices) the






0(0). This case lies thus between the basic case where markup
is constant as c ! 1 and the exogenous recall variance case where it is proportional to c.
6 Related Models
In this Section the price recall model is compared with the price competition model
with utility uncertainty and the classic horizontal dierentiation model.
6.1 Comparison to Utility Uncertainty
The literature related to this paper takes an approach close to the quantal response
equilibrium concept, as in Gabaix and Laibson (2004) and Gabaix, Laibson, and Li (2005).
That is, consumers14 are not able to compare two utility levels, corresponding to two
alternatives, perfectly. Mathematically, instead of comparing U1 and U2, they compare
the utility plus a shock, U1 + 1 with U2 + 2.
For the simple case of xed demand, where consumers are willing to buy one and only
one unit of the good, this is equivalent to the present model where the random component
is added to the price. In a utility shock setting, consumers compare (u   p1) + 1 with
(u   p2) + 2, where u is the monetary utility of having the good. This is equivalent to
the comparison of u   (p1 + 0
1) with u   (p2 + 0
2) where 0
i =  i, i = 1;2.
But once the assumption of xed demand is relaxed, the models yield dierent pre-
dictions.
Let V (p) be the total indirect utility function of a consumer from buying the good at
price p, that is the indirect utility minus the cost in utility units. The consumers when
facing pA and pB compare V (pA)+A with V (pB)+B, where A and B are i.i.d. random
14This bounded rationality argument can also be applied to the rms, as Baye and Morgan (2004) do. The
rationale for this option is however not so clear. The possible gains and losses at stake for the rms are clearly
higher, as is their availability to compute the problem lengthily through.
21errors. Dene the probability of a given consumer to consider rm i as having the best
option as q(V (pj)   V (pi)) with j 6= i, where q() = 1   g() as now consumers opt for
the highest V () instead of the lowest p. Now the procedure to nd the equilibrium price
follows closely that of previous Sections15. Equation (8) becomes now
p
p   c
=  "(p) + 2q0(0)V 0(p)p;
where g0(0) became q0(0)V 0(p) since this term follows from   @
@piq(V (pj)   V (pi)) at
pi = pj.
Consider the simple case of constant elasticity of demand  1 < "(p) < 0 for a com-
parison of the implications of the two approaches. Demand is given by D(p) = D0p a
so that "(p) =  a for any p  0, where D0 > 0 is some constant. Assuming that the
expenditure on the product on focus is small compared to the total income of the con-
sumer, one can take the marginal utility of income  as xed when setting the consumer
utility function for this purchasing behavior. Thus the (separable) utility of the good that
yields the desired demand function is simply U =  U0x 
1 a
a with U0 > 0 and x being







. The total indirect utility function as a function of price is












If i are Gumbel i.i.d. then a given consumer chooses rm A with probability q(V (pB)  
V (pA)) dened by
q(V (pB)   V (pA)) =
1


























where q0(0) =  




1 ap a were used. It is hard to compare
the two models, because the utility uncertainty has more degrees of freedom. But two
observations can be made that distinguish them, both related to the change from g0(0)
to q0(0)V 0(p). First, the equilibrium price equation now contains U0 (or D0) meaning
that products with the same elasticity of demand may have dierent equilibrium prices.
In the price recall model, both demand and market share depend solely on price so the
rm incentives only depend on price. Now the market share, related to the probability of
correctly choosing the good according to its utility, depends on U0 (or D0). Consumers
make less mistakes for products with higher U0 (that is with a higher demand parameter
D0) so the competition pressure will be stronger and the prices lower.
Second, the new term contains now p1 a instead of p implying a non-linear response
to price. Recall that the g0(0) or q0(0)V 0(p) term can be interpreted as an increase in
the (absolute value) of the elasticity of demand when compared to the monopolistic price
setting. If a is close to 1, this increase is almost independent of p.
Therefore the new bounded rationality concept not only oers a more intuitive and
tractable model, but its predictions depart from the common model in the literature.
Assuming a shock in the utility, instead of in the price, changes the new term showing up
15The assumption needed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibrium diers. Here it is sucient
that
@
@pi lnq(V (pj)   V (pi)) is non-increasing in pi for any pj  0.
22in the equilibrium Lerner index of the rms. The price in the utility shock model depends
on many parameters, namely on the demand level D0, the functional form of the indirect
utility function, the price elasticity of demand and the error distribution, whereas only
the last parameters is to be found on the price shock model.
6.2 Price Recall as a Horizontal Dierentiation Model
As argued in Section 3.1.5 the price recall model also resembles the horizontal dier-
entiation model in the basic cases with xed unitary demand. This equivalence is however
not true for distributions with full support. If the rms are placed in the \extremes" of
the innite horizontal line, then for any strictly positive distance cost, both total prices
(good plus distance cost) will be innite for all consumers. The full support cases can
however be approximated by distributions with bounded support, assuring that the latter
yields an interior solution. The problem with the approximation is that in the latter case
a rm can have the whole market if it chooses a suciently low price. Again this can
be avoided by assuming high distance costs and equivalently high utility of the good to
guarantee that all the market is covered. Assigning a high utility may however distort
further applications of the model, for instance in welfare analysis.
In the price recall model it is natural to assume that the dierence between the price
recall errors follows some usual symmetric probability distribution, but it is intuitively
not so clear why the consumers in the horizontal dierentiation framework should be
densely concentrated in the center of the horizontal line, a feature which is necessary
for the formal equivalence. But the models diverge more once one moves away from the
basic case and considers elastic demand. The reason is that in the horizontal model,
the distance decreases the willingness to buy the goods, either because the total price is
higher (transportation costs interpretation) or the value of the good is lower (preferred
variety interpretation). Put simple, in a horizontal dierentiation model the distance
represents a worse alternative. In the price recall model the distance only reects a
lower probability of buying the good. In the rst case the consumers choose to buy less,
in the latter demand remains constant. Mathematically, the demand in the horizontal
dierentiation model is given by the integral of dierent demands along the line, here
it is simply demand as a function of price times the market share. In equation (1')
the market share term remains unchanged in horizontal dierentiation models, but the
demand term becomes an analytically complex term16. This also makes the bounded
support approximation problem more salient. Assuming a value of the good which is
suciently high to guarantee a covered market and an interior solution, is not compatible
with a low demand. Put dierently, in the limit case where recall error variance goes to
innity, the market in the price recall model is split between the rms irrespective of their
prices, acting both as a monopolist in their half. The demand they get is not aected.
That is not so for horizontal dierentiation. A robust market split only occurs for distance
costs increasing towards innite, but that would have an impact in actual demand.
The distinctness is also more evident when extensions are considered. In Section 5 the
recall error variance is endogenized, being it a choice of the individual consumers (could be
a choice of rms as well). In the horizontal dierentiation model this would be equivalent
to having the individual consumer choosing the distribution (or the distance cost) of the
whole market. Risk aversion of rms' managers would also damage the analogy, because
the focus here has been expected (therefore random) market share. Moreover, in horizontal
dierentiation the positioning of rms can conceptually be a decision of the agents, but
here that cannot be the case.
16The Hotelling model with elastic demand is only mathematically tractable for very specic parameter
functions. See for instance Puu (2002).
237 Conclusions
In this paper a model of bounded rationality of the demand side in price compe-
tition settings is presented. Assuming a simple and intuitive extension of the classic
Bertrand model, some of its paradoxes are solved. Competitive rms do charge above
the competitive equilibrium price, having therefore a positive prot. There is no benet
(in equilibrium) in lowering the price for some consumers will still recall the other rm's
price as lower. This has obvious welfare damaging eects, which can be easily obtained
given the proposed characterization of the equilibrium which is equivalent to that of a
monopoly price model. Moreover it was shown that in some cases with asymmetric costs
both the rms and the consumers incur welfare costs compared to the classic case.
Firms with dierent costs do coexist in the market. Price dispersion does persist in
competitive frameworks. In the simple setting, price dispersion increases with the recall
errors. If the eort choice is endogenized, consumers put more eort when purchasing a
valuable product.
While these results are quite interesting by itself, this extension may turn many mod-
els more realistic on the demand side. For instance in multi-product retail pricing, the
capacity of consumers of comparing price vectors of baskets of goods seems to t a central
issue. It also leads to continuous demands and continuous best response functions, which
are more realistic and sometimes analytically more tractable.
A nal word on the rationality of consumers. Here it was assumed that all consumers
had the same type and degree of bounded rationality. That is actually a weak assumption
because all consumers act rationally once at the store. If one were to consider consumers
with heterogeneous recall errors, the trade-o of the rms would still be consisted of
the two trade-os, the same monopoly-like trade-o and a similar marginal market share
dispute. The former is independent of the type of consumers and the later can be mimicked
with homogeneous consumers with a dierent recall error distribution.
A Appendix
A.1 Price Cost Partial Derivatives
Equation (11) and its counterpart can be rewritten as
Hi(pi;pj;ci)  (pi   ci)( "(pi)   pi
@
@pi
lng(pj   pi))   pi = 0; (17)
for i;j = A;B and i 6= j.
The partial derivatives of the equilibrium prices with respect to costs (both that of
the considered rm and that of the opponent) are obtained by implicit dierentiation of








































24From (17) it follows that
@Hi
@pi















lng(pj   pi)   1;
@Hi
@pj













for i;j = A;B, i 6= j. Because the partial derivatives will be taken at cA = cB = c, and
therefore at pA = pB = p, one can perform the change @



























Using x = @Hi
@ci , y =  @Hi
@pj and z = @Hi
@pi + @Hi




































where 2g0(0) = 1
p c +
"(p)
p from (9) was used. To see that the denominator is positive,
substitute
p c



































where all square brackets are strictly positive given that the markup p   c is strictly
positive, due to the distribution full support. For the simplication of the other fraction
25the following will be needed
 
d2










The second derivative of g(:) at 0 equals zero because A and B have the same distribution,
so that g(x) = 1   g( x), therefore g00(x) =  g00( x), which implies g00(0) = 0. Now the















(p"0(p)   "(p)) + 8(p   c)2g02(0)
:
Notice that both the denominator and the numerator are strictly positive, so that this





























(p"0(p)   "(p)) + 8(p   c)2g02(0)
: (22)
Using the Gumbel distribution, so that g0(0) = 






















































+ 2[1   a]
:
At cA = cB = c ! 1 the equilibrium prices will be p   c = 1
b+=2, the term
p c




















Pricing behavior depending on other rm's cost at ci = cj


































(p"0(p)   "(p)) + 8(p   c)2g02(0)
: (23)
While the rst fraction is the same as above (therefore positive), the second one is dierent.
It is however easy to see that it is also positive, because the denominator is again the





for the disappearing terms in the numerator are positive.































































For prices and price errors of comparable magnitude, that is c = 0 and p = 1 a







[1   a]2 ( 
2
1 a
b+=2) 2 + 2[1   a]
=
1
[1   a]2 ( 
2
1 a
b+=2) 2 + 2[1   a]
=
1
[2b= + 1]2 + 2[1   a]
:
The limit for cA = cB = c ! 1, which implies
p c







[2b= + 1]2 + 2
:
A.2 Price Dispersion with Asymmetric Costs

























































































p c and equation (21) were used in the simplication.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4







equation (14) is decreasing in . Write now g0
0(0) 1 for g0(0), following equation (4).










  (p   c)

: (25)
The sign of the derivative equals the sign of the term between the brackets, because
all other terms are strictly positive. Because a constant elasticity is being considered,
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0(0) + 1   "
2
;
implying that the square root is smaller than the numerator which shows that the above
expression is negative. Therefore the term 
dp

d   (p   c) is negative and the last term
in the denominator of equation (14) is decreasing in . Hence the whole denominator is
decreasing in .
A.4 Figures








































































Figure 1: Equilibrium prices, market share of rm i and prots depending on the cost of rm
i, ci. The straight lines denote rm i, the dashed lines rm j and the dotted the monopolist
with ci. Chosen parameters cj = 5, D(p) = e  1
2 logp 
p




distribution. Left column:  = 20, var() = 2
2400, center column:  = 2, var() = 2
24, right
column:  = 0:2, var() = 252
6 .
























Figure 2: Aggregate prot decrease as a function of the standard deviation of the recall error,
with D(p) = e  1
2 logp 
p
10 so that "(p) =  1
2  
p
10, and Gumbel distribution. Firm i with ci = 0
and straight line, rm j with cj = 5 and dashed line. Total prots represented by the thick
line.

























Figure 3: Equilibrium prices and two measures of price dispersion for (c1;c2;c3) = (1;2;3)
depending on the standard deviation of the Gumbel distributed recall error. Firm 1, 2 and 3
represented by the dashed, the thick and the normal line. Demand is D(p) = 10p  1
2 so that
its price elasticity is "(p) =  1
2.























Figure 4: Equilibrium prices and two measures of price dispersion for (c1;c2;c3) = (1;1;2)
depending on the standard deviation of the Gumbel distributed recall error. Firm 1 and 2
represented by the dashed line, rm 3 by the thick line. Demand is D(p) = 10p  1
2 so that its
price elasticity is "(p) =  1
2.























Figure 5: Equilibrium prices and two measures of price dispersion for (c1;c2;c3) = (1;2;2)
depending on the standard deviation of the Gumbel distributed recall error. Firm 1 repre-
sented by the dashed line, rms 2 and 3 by the thick line. Demand is D(p) = 10p  1
2 so that
its price elasticity is "(p) =  1
2.
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